We propose a Ricardian trade model with horizontal and vertical di¤erentiation, where individuals'willingness to pay for quality rises with their income, and productivity di¤erentials across countries are stronger for high-quality goods. Our theory predicts that the scope for trade widens and international specialisation intensi…es as incomes grow and wealthier consumers raise the quality of their consumption baskets. This implies that comparative advantages intensify gradually over the path of development as a by-product of the process of quality upgrading.
Introduction
Income is a key determinant of consumer choice. A crucial dimension through which purchasing power in ‡uences this choice is the quality of consumption. People with very di¤erent incomes tend to consume commodities within the same category of goods, such as clothes, cars, wines, etc.
However, the actual quality of the consumed commodities di¤ers substantially when looking at poorer versus richer households. The same reasoning naturally extends to countries with di¤erent levels of income per capita. In this case, the quality dimension of consumption entails important implications on the evolution of trade ‡ows.
Several recent studies have investigated the links between quality of consumption and international trade. One strand of literature has centred their attention on the demand side, …nding a strong positive correlation between quality of imports and the importer's income per head [Hallak (2006) , Fieler (2011a) ]. 1 On the other hand, a set of papers have focused on whether exporters adjust the quality of their production to serve markets with di¤erent income levels. The evidence here also points towards the presence of nonhomothetic preferences along the quality dimension, showing that producers sell higher quality versions of their output to richer importers. 2 These empirical …ndings have motivated a number of models that yield trade patterns where richer importers buy high-quality versions of goods, while exporters di¤erentiate the quality of their output by income at destination [Hallak (2010) , Fajgelbaum, Grossman and Helpman (2011), Jaimovich and Merella (2012) ]. Yet, this literature has approached the determinants of countries' sectoral specialisation as a phenomenon that is independent of the process of quality upgrading resulting from higher consumer incomes. This paper investigates whether exchanging higher or lower quality versions of output a¤ects the categories of goods that countries specialise in, and the intensity of trade links that they establish with di¤erent importers. We propose a theory where quality upgrading in consumption becomes the central driving force behind a general process of comparative advantage intensi…cation and varying bilateral trade links at di¤erent levels of income.
Our theory is grounded on the hypothesis that productivity di¤erentials are stronger for higher- 1 See also related evidence in Choi, Hummels and Xiang (2009), Francois and Kaplan (1996) and Dalgin, Trindade and Mitra (2008) . 2 For example, Verhoogen (2008) and Iacovone and Javorcik (2008) provide evidence of Mexican manufacturing plants selling higher qualities in US than in their local markets. Brooks (2006) establishes the same results for Colombian manufacturing plants, and Manova and Zhang (2012) show that Chinese …rms ship higher qualities of their exports to richer importers. Analogous evidence is provided by Bastos and Silva (2010) for Portuguese …rms, and by Crino and Epifani (2012) for Italian ones. quality goods, combined with the notion that willingness to pay for quality rises with income.
Within this framework, we show that international specialisation and trade intensify over the growth path. The evolution of trade ‡ows featured by our model presents novel speci…cities that stem from the interaction between nonhomothetic preferences and the deepening of sectoral productivity di¤erentials at higher levels of quality. In particular, the process of quality upgrading with rising income sets in motion both demand-driven and supply-driven factors, leading to a simultaneous rise in specialisation by importers and exporters over the growth path. Import and export specialisation take place together precisely because, as countries become richer, consumers shift their spending towards high-quality goods, which are exactly those that tend to display greater scope for export specialisation.
We model a world economy with a continuum of horizontally di¤erentiated goods, each of them available in a continuum of vertically ordered quality levels. Each country produces a particular variety of every good. The production technology di¤ers both across countries and sectors. We assume that some countries are intrinsically better than others in producing certain types of goods.
In addition, these intrinsic productivity di¤erentials on the horizontal dimension tend to become increasingly pronounced along the vertical dimension. These assumptions lead to an intensifying process of Ricardian specialisation as production moves up on the quality ladders of each good.
For example, a country may have a cost advantage in producing wine, while another country may have it in whisky. This would naturally lead them to exchange these two goods. Yet, in our model, productivity di¤erences in the wine and whisky industries do not remain constant along the quality space, but become more intense as production moves up towards higher quality versions of those goods. As a result, the scope for international trade turns out to be wider for high-quality wines and whiskies than for low-quality ones.
We combine such a production structure with nonhomothetic preferences on the quality dimension. This implies that, given market prices, richer individuals consume higher quality versions of the di¤erentiated goods. Within this framework, we show that at low levels of income both export and import specialisation remain low. The reason for this result is that productivity di¤erentials across …rms from di¤erent economies are relatively narrow for goods o¤ered in low quality versions.
However, in a growth context, as individuals upgrade their quality of consumption, sectoral productivity di¤erentials deepen, which in turn leads to a gradual process of increasing international specialisation.
Our model thus suggests that the study of the evolution of trade links may require considering a more ‡exible concept of comparative advantage than the one traditionally used in the literature, so as to encompass quality upgrading as an inherent part of it. In the literature of Ricardian trade, the comparative advantage is solely determined by exporters' technologies. This paper instead sustains that both the importers'incomes and the exporters'sectoral productivities must be taken into account in order to establish a rank of comparative advantage. This is because the degree of comparative advantage between any two countries is crucially a¤ected by the quality of consumption of their consumers. As a consequence, richer and poorer importers may end up establishing trade links with di¤erent partners, simply because the gaps between their willingnessto-pay for quality may translate into unequal degrees of comparative advantage with respect to the same set of exporters.
The conditionality of comparative advantage on importers incomes entails clear and testable predictions on the evolution of trade ‡ows. In particular, the model yields predictions that link di¤erent importers to speci…c exporters. According to our model, the share of imports originating from exporters exhibiting a cost advantage in a given good must grow with the income per head of the importer. This would be the result of richer importers buying high-quality versions of goods, which are the type of commodities for which cost di¤erentials across countries are relatively more pronounced. In that regard, we …rst test the notion that productivity di¤erentials deepen at higher levels of quality of production. Next, we provide evidence consistent with the prediction that richer economies are more likely to buy their imports from producers who display a comparative advantage in the imported goods.
Related Literature
Nonhomothetic preferences are by now a widespread modelling choice in the trade literature.
However, most of the past trade literature with nonhomotheticities has focused either on vertical di¤erentiation [e.g., Flam and Helpman (1987) , Stokey (1991) and Murphy and Shleifer (1997)] or horizontal di¤erentiation in consumption [e.g., Markusen (1986) , Bergstrand (1990) and Matsuyama (2000) ]. 3 Two recent articles have combined vertical and horizontal di¤erentiation with preferences featuring income-dependent willingness to pay for quality: Fajgelbaum, Grossman and Helpman (2011) and Jaimovich and Merella (2012). Fajgelbaum et al. (2011) analyse how di¤erences in income distributions between economies 3 For some recent contributions with horizontal di¤erentiation and nonhomothetic preferences see, for example:
Foellmi, Hepenstrick and Zweimuller (2010) and Tarasov (2012) , where consumers are subject to a discrete consumption choice (they must consume either zero or one unit for each good), and Fieler (2011b) who, using a CES utility function, ties the income elasticity of consumption goods across di¤erent industries to the degree of substitution of goods within the same industry.
with access to the same technologies determine trade ‡ows in the presence of increasing returns and trade cost. Like ours, their paper leads to an endogenous emergence of comparative advantages, which may have remained latent for quite some time (either due to trade costs being too high or countries' income distributions being too similar). Our paper, instead, sticks to the Ricardian tradition where trade is the result of di¤ erences in technologies featuring constant returns to scale.
In particular, in our model, comparative advantages and trade emerge gradually, not because trade costs obstruct the course of increasing returns, but because the demand for commodities displaying wider heterogeneity in cost of production (i.e., high-quality goods) expands as incomes rise. In that respect, an important di¤erence between the two papers is the reason why high-quality versions of goods are inherently more tradable than low-quality ones: in Fajgelbaum et al. (2011) this is due to quality-speci…c trade costs, while in our model it is the result of technological factors.
Jaimovich and Merella (2012) also propose a nonhomothetic preference speci…cation where budget reallocations take place both within and across horizontally di¤erentiated goods. That paper, however, remained within a standard Ricardian framework where absolute and comparative advantages are determined from the outset, and purely by technological conditions. Hence, nonhomothetic preferences play no essential role there in determining export and import specialisation at di¤erent levels of development. By contrast, it is the interaction between rising di¤erences in productivity at higher quality levels and nonhomotheticities in quality that generates our novel results in terms of co-evolution of export and import specialisation.
A key assumption in our theory is the widening in productivity di¤erentials at higher levels of quality. To the best of our knowledge, Alcala (2012) is the only other paper that has explicitly introduced a similar feature into a Ricardian model of trade. An important di¤erence between the two papers is that Alcala's keeps the homothetic demand structure presented in Dornbusch, Fisher and Samuelson (1977) essentially intact. Nonhomotheticities in demand are actually crucial to our story and, in particular, to its main predictions regarding the evolution of trade ‡ows and specialisation at di¤erent levels of income.
Finally, Fieler (2011b) also studies the interplay between nonhomothetic demand and Ricardian technological disparities. She shows that, when productivity di¤erences are stronger for goods with high income elasticity, her model matches quite closely key features of North-North and NorthSouth trade. Our model di¤ers from hers in that the e¤ects of demand on trade stem from the allocation of spending within categories of goods rather than across them. Our results therefore hinge on richer consumers switching their good-speci…c expenditure shares from lower-quality to higher-quality versions of the goods. It is in fact this within-good substitution process that leads to our predictions of income-dependent spending shares across di¤erent exporters. 4 The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 studies a world economy with a continuum of countries where all economies have the same level of income per head in equilibrium.
Section 3 generalises the main results to a world economy where some countries are richer than others. Section 4 presents some empirical results consistent with the main predictions of our model. Section 5 concludes. All relevant proofs can be found in the Appendices.
A world economy with equally rich countries
We study a world economy with a unit continuum of countries indexed by v 2 V. In each country there is a continuum of individuals with unit mass. Each individual is endowed with one unit of labour time. We assume labour is immobile across countries. In addition, we assume all countries are open to international trade, and there are no trading costs of any sort.
Our model will display two main distinctive features: …rst, productivity di¤erentials across countries will rise with the quality level of the commodities being produced; second, richer individuals will choose to consume higher-quality commodities than poorer ones. Subections 2.2 and 2.3 specify the functional forms of production technologies and consumer preferences that we adopt to generate these two features. In subsection 2.1 we describe formally the set of consumption goods in our world economy.
Commodity space
All countries share a common commodity space de…ned along three distinct dimensions: a horizontal, a varietal, and a vertical dimension.
Concerning the horizontal dimension, there exists a unit continuum of di¤erentiated goods, indexed by z, where z 2 Z = [0; 1]. In terms of the varietal dimension, we assume that each country v 2 V = [0; 1] produces a speci…c variety v of each good z. Finally, our vertical dimension refers to the intrinsic quality of the commodity: a continuum of di¤erent qualities q, where q 2 Q = [1; 1), are potentially available for every variety v of each good z. As a result, in our setup, each commodity is designated by a speci…c good-variety-quality index, (z; v; q) 2 Z V Q.
To …x ideas, the horizontal dimension refers to di¤erent types of goods, such as cars, wines, co¤ee beans, etc. The varietal dimension refers to the di¤erent varieties of any given type of good, originating from di¤erent countries, such as Spanish and French wines (di¤ering, for instance, in speci…c traits like the types of grapes and regional vini…cation techniques). The vertical dimension refers to the intrinsic quality of each speci…c commodity (e.g., the ageing and the grapes selection in the winemaking). 5 
Production technologies
In each country v there exists a continuum of …rms in each sector z that may transform local labour into a variety v of good z. Production technologies are idiosyncratic both to the sector z and to the country v. In particular, we assume that, in order to produce one unit of commodity (z; v; q), a …rm from country v in sector z needs to use z;v (q) units of labour, where:
Unit labour requirements contain two key technological parameters. The …rst is > 0, which applies identically to all sectors and countries, and we interpret it as the worldwide total factor productivity level. As such, in our model, increases in will capture the e¤ects of aggregate growth and rising real incomes. The second is z;v , which may di¤er both across z and v, and governs the elasticity of the labour requirements with respect to quality upgrading. In what follows, we assume that each parameter z;v is independently drawn from a probability density function with uniform distribution over the interval ; . In addition, we assume that > 1. Hence, z;v (q)
are always strictly increasing and convex in q.
To ease notation, we will henceforth denote A e ( 1)= ( 1) . Notice that the parameter A is simply a scale factor between labour input units and quality units. We include this additional term only to help simplifying the algebra of the consumer's optimisation problem to be presented in the following subsection. 6 5 We should stress that while the horizontal and the vertical dimensions (z and q, respectively) are crucial ingredients to our story, the varietal dimension (v) is only subsidiary to it. In that respect, our commodity space could be seen as an extension of that in Dornbusch, Fischer and Samuelson (1977) exhibiting a quality ladder within each sector z. The main reason why we include also the varietal dimension v is to (possibly) allow more than one country to actively produce each good at a certain quality level. More precisely, we wish to leave room for the model to determine the degree of specialisation of each country v in good z at quality level q, rather than having only one economy producing each good z at a speci…c level of quality. 6 All our main results hold qualitatively true when the labour income requirement are given by z;v (q) = q z;v =(1+ ), only at the cost of more tedious algebra.
Remark 1 (Cost advantage along the quality space) Our speci…cation of z;v (q) characterizes the …rst key feature of our model: cross-country productivity di¤ erentials rise with the level of quality of production. For any given good z, the unit labour requirement in country v 00 relative to country v 0 increases with quality q whenever z;v 0 < z;v 00 . Formally, the derivative of the ratio z;v 00 (q) = z;v 0 (q) = q z;v 00 z;v 0 with respect to q yields z;v 00 z;v 0 q z;v 00 z;v 0 1 , which is positive for any q 2 Q. In our model, this will in turn imply that the cost advantage of the country with the better sectoral productivity draw will widen up along the quality dimension of production.
Let w v denote henceforth the wage per unit of labour time in country v. Assuming that all …rms in each sector z of country v have access to the same technology (that is, sectoral productivities di¤er only across …rms in di¤erent countries), perfect competition within countries ensures that all commodities will be priced exactly at their unit cost. That is:
From (2) it follows that changes in leave all relative prices unaltered. In this regard, we may consider a rise in total factor productivity as an increase in real income, as it entails no substitution e¤ect across the di¤erent commodities. 7 
Preferences and budget constraint
All individuals in the world share identical preferences de…ned over the good-variety-quality space described in Section 2.1.
To simplify the analysis, we preliminarily introduce the following assumption:
Assumption 1 (Selection of quality) For each good-variety pair (z; v) 2 Z V, individuals consume a strictly positive amount of physical quantity of only one quality version of it.
Assumption 1 is analogous to assuming an in…nite elasticity of substitution across di¤erent quality versions of the good z sourced from country v. 8 Henceforth, to ease notation, we denote the 7 One may be tempted to infer from (2) that a rise in leads to a lower price of quality. However, this would only be an appropriate interpretation if individuals were supposed to consume a single unit of each good, as it is the case for example in Flam and Helpman (1987) . As it will become clearer in the next subsection, in our model individuals do not purchase quality directly, but only via physical units of commodities that embody a certain level of quality. Moreover, since physical consumption is not restricted to one unit per good, a higher reduces, through (2), the cost of any combination of quantity and quality in the same proportion. 8 See equation (20) in Appendix A for the derivation of utility (3) replacing Assumption 1 by an in…nite elasticity of substitution across di¤erent quality versions of z sourced from v.
selected quality of variety v of good z simply by q z;v . In addition, we denote by c z;v the consumed physical quantity of the selected quality q z;v .
Preferences are de…ned over the physical quantities fc z;v g consumed in the selected quality levels fq z;v g. We let preferences be summarised by the following utility function:
Individuals choose the physical quantity to consume for each of the selected qualities, subject to the budget constraint:
where we have already substituted the price p z;v of each consumed commodity q z;v by its expression as a function of technological parameters and wage according to (2) . 9 The utility function (3) displays a number of features that is worth discussing in further detail.
Firstly, considering the quality dimension in isolation, the exponential terms f(c z;v ) qz;v g in (3) are instrumental to obtaining our desired non-homothetic behaviour along the quality space. As the remark below formally describes, the exponential functional form implies that, whenever c z;v > 1, the magnifying e¤ect of quality becomes increasingly important as c z;v rises. Such non-homothetic feature in turn leads to a solution of the consumer problem where higher real incomes -which could be generated either by increases in or in w in the budget constraint (4)-will translate into quality upgrading of consumption.
Remark 2 (Nonhomotheticities along the quality dimension) The terms f(c z;v ) qz;v g in (3) lead to preferences that are nonhomothetic along the quality dimension of the commodity space.
Abstracting for a moment from Assumption 1, this can be seen by taking any two qualities levels q < q of the same commodity (z; v) and observing that the marginal rate of substitution of the physical quantities of consumption at those quality levels, namely c z;v;q for c z;v;q , is non-decreasing 9 Rigorously speaking, our preference speci…cation should be written down as follows:
so that raising the quality of a given quantity of consumption is never bad for the consumer. Notice that in the max operator the term cz;v applies whenever 0 cz;v < 1, while cz;v qz;v applies whenever cz;v 1. Since according to (2) prices are strictly increasing in q, it turns out that individuals would choose qz;v > 1 only if cz;v > 1; otherwise the simply set qz;v = 1. For this reason we can simplify the expression to (3) at no analytical cost to our results.
along a proportional expansion path of c z;v;q and c z;v;q . 10 Secondly, abstracting now from the quality dimension, (3) features two nested CES functions.
On the one hand, for each good z, the (inner) logarithmic function bundling the exponential terms of the varieties sourced from the di¤erent countries v 2 V implies a unit elasticity of substitution across varieties of the same good z. On the other hand, the parameter < 0 characterizing the (outer) function mapping the bundles of the di¤erent goods z 2 Z into utility U implies that the elasticity of substitution across goods is equal to 1= (1 ) < 1. The speci…cation in (3) then intends to capture the notion that the elasticity of substitution across di¤erent goods is smaller than within goods (i.e., across the di¤erent varieties of the same good).
Utility maximisation
When optimising (3) subject to (4) we must take into account the fact that the consumer's income may well di¤er across countries. Hereafter, we use the letter i 2 V to refer to the country of origin of a speci…c consumer, and we use i as a superindex any time we refer to choices made by consumers from country i.
The consumer's problem requires choosing combinations of (non-negative) quantities on the good-variety-quality commodity space, subject to (4). However, it turns out that the optimisation problem may be simpli…ed by letting i z;v denote the demand intensity in country i 2 V for the variety v 2 V of good z 2 Z. Accordingly, we may note that c i z;v = i z;v w i =p z;v (where recall that p z;v is the market price of commodity q z;v ). Hence, using (2), we may write:
We may then restate the original consumer's optimisation problem into one de…ned only in terms of optimal seclected qualities and optimal budget allocations across varieties of goods. Below we state the reformulated consumer's problem.
An individual from country i 2 V chooses the optimal quality q i z;v and optimal budget allocation 1 0 Formally, this can be observed by computing M RS(cz;v;q; cz;v;q) from utility (20) in Appendix A. Then, along a proportional expansion path cz;v;q = k cz;v;q, where k > 0, we have that:
M RS k cz;v;q; cz;v;q = q=q k q 1 cz;v;;
which is increasing for any cz;v;q > 1. 
We can observe that relative wages (w i =w v ) may play a role in the optimisation problem (6).
For the time being, we will shut down this channel, and characterise the solution of (6) only for the case in which wages are the same in all countries. (Indeed, as it will be shown next, in this speci…cation of the model all wages will turn out to be equal in equilibrium.)
In addition, @q i z 0 ;v 0 =@ > 0.
Proof. In Appendix A.
Lemma 1 characterises the solution of the consumer's problem in terms of two sets of variables:
(i) the expressions in (7), which stipulate the quality level in which each variety of every horizontally di¤erentiated good is optimally consumed; (ii) the expressions in (8) describing the optimal expenditure shares allocated to those commodities. Furthermore, the result @q i z;v =@ > 0 summarises the key nonhomothetic behaviour present in our model: quality upgrading of consumption.
That is, as real incomes grow with a rising , individuals substitute (previously selected) lowerquality versions of every variety v of each good z by (previously not consumed) better versions of them. 12 
Equilibrium and specialisation
In equilibrium, total world spending on commodities produced in country v must equal the total labour income in country v (which is itself equal to the total value of goods produced in v). Bearing in mind (6), we may then write down the market clearing conditions as follows:
More formally, an equilibrium in the world economy is given by a set of wages fw v g v2V such that: i ) prices of all traded commodities are determined by (2); ii ) consumers from country i 2 V choose their allocations q i z;v ;
by solving (6); and iii ) the market clearing conditions stipulated in (9) hold simultaneously for all countries.
Proposition 1 Suppose that, for each commodity (z; v) 2 Z V, z;v is independently drawn from a uniform density function with support ; . Then, for any > 0, in equilibrium:
Proposition 1 shows that, in this (symmetric) world economy, the equilibrium relative wages remain unchanged and equal to unity all along the growth path. The reason for this result is the following: as rises, and real incomes accordingly increase, aggregate demands and supplies grow together at identical speed in all countries. As a consequence, markets clearing conditions in (9) will constantly hold true without the need of any adjustment in relative wages across economies.
The equiproportional aggregate variations implicit in Proposition 1 conceal the fact that, as increases, economies actually experience signi…cant changes in their consumption and production structures at the sectoral level. In other words, although aggregate demands and supplies change at the same speed in all countries, sectoral demands and supplies do not, which in turn leads to country-speci…c processes of labour reallocation across sectors. Such sectoral reallocations of labour stem from the interplay of demand and supply side factors. On the demand side, as real incomes grow with a rising , individuals start consuming higher quality varieties of each commodityas can be observed from (7). On the supply side, heterogeneities in sectoral labour productivities across countries become stronger as producers raise the quality of their output. Hence, the interplay between income-dependent willingness to pay for quality and intensi…cation of sectoral productivity di¤erences at higher levels of quality leads to a process of increasing sectoral specialisation as
rises.
In what follows we study the e¤ects of the above-mentioned sectoral reallocations of labour on the trade ‡ows across economies. In particular, we focus on the evolution of two variables as we let the worldwide total factor productivity parameter rise. With regards to the demand side of the economy, we examine the import penetration (IP) of commodity (z; v) in country i. With reference to the supply side of the economy, we look at the revealed comparative advantage (RCA) of country v in sector z.
For every commodity (z; v), we thus compute the following ratios:
and
where M i z;v is consumption of commodity (z; v) by country i, M i z is total consumption of good z by country i, X z;v (resp. W z ) is the total value of exports of good z by country v (resp. by the world), and X v (resp. W ) is the aggregate value of exports by country v (resp. by the world).
Note that, from our de…nition of
In addition, regarding the variables in (11) , since in our model each country sells a negligible share of its own production domestically, we can safely disregard the e¤ect of sales to local consumers and simply write:
Consider …rst the variables relative to single countries. We can observe that Proposition 1 implies that
Hence, bearing in mind that V has unit measure, X z;v = z;v . Moreover, from Proposition 1 and (9), it follows that R V z;v dv = 1 and
Let us look now at the world-level variables, W z and W . Notice that, by the law of large numbers, when considering country-speci…c draws, for every good z 2 Z, the sequence of sectoral productivity draws z;v v2V will turn out to be uniformly distributed over the interval ; along the countries space V. As a consequence, the world spending on good z will be equal for all goods, in turn implying that
Plugging all these results into (10) and (11) …nally implies that:
In other words, the revealed comparative advantage of country v in sector z, which represents our indicator of export specialisation, is given by the total value of exports of good z by country v. In addition, in our symmetric world economy, the total value of exports equals the demand intensity for commodity (z; v), which is identical for all countries i 2 V, and in turn equals the import penetration in any of those countries, our measure of import specialisation.
The following proposition characterises in further detail the main properties of each z;v 2 Z V in this symmetric world economy. Subsequently, we provide some economic interpretation of the formal results in Proposition 2 in terms of both exports and imports specialisation. 
The results collected in Proposition 2 characterise the link between sectoral productivities and labour allocations across sectors. Part (i) states that larger shares of resources are allocated to sectors that received better productivity draws (i.e., sectors carrying lower z;v ). Next, part (ii) of the proposition establishes that the concentration of resources towards those sectors further intensi…es as world incomes rise. Finally, part (iii) shows that there exists a threshold b , such that sectors whose z 0 ;v 0 < b experience an increase in their shares when grows, while the opposite occurs to sectors whose z 00 ;v 00 > b .
From a supply side perspective, Proposition 2 allows two types of interpretations. Firstly, by …xing v 00 = v 0 , we can compare di¤erent sectors of a given exporter. From this perspective, the proposition states that countries export more from those sectors where they enjoy higher labour productivity and a stronger RCA. Secondly, by …xing z 00 = z 0 , we may compare a given sector across di¤erent exporters. In this case, recalling (12), we can observe the RCA of exporter v in sector z turns out to be monotonically linked to the productivity draw z;v : that is, countries that receive better draws for sector z enjoy a stronger revealed comparative advantage in that sector.
In addition, notice that, according to part (ii) of the proposition, both sectoral specialisation and export specialisation intensify as increases over the growth path.
From a demand side perspective, part (ii) of Proposition 2 may be interpreted as a result on increasing import specialisation along the growth path. In particular, …xing z 00 = z 0 , our model predicts that as economies get richer, we observe a process of growing import penetration of the varieties of z produced by exporters who received better productivity draws in sector z.
The equilibrium characterised in this section has the particular feature that revealed comparative advantages coincide with the import penetrations. This is clearly a very speci…c result that hinges on the assumed symmetry in the distributions of sector-speci…c productivities across countries. The next section shows that this is no longer the case when we introduce some asymmetry across countries. As we will see, although the results discussed here hold qualitatively unchanged, an asymmetric world leads to a richer characterisation of the links between export specialisation, import specialisation and income per capita.
A world economy with cross-country inequality
The previous section has dealt with a world economy where, in equilibrium, all countries exhibit the same real income. In this section, we slightly modify the previous setup in order give room for cross-country inequality. On the one hand, this extension allows us to generalise the previous results concerning export specialisation to a case in which productivity di¤erentials and cost di¤erentials may not always coincide (as a result of equilibrium wages that are di¤erent between some countries). On the other hand, introducing cross-country inequality allows us to generate more powerful predictions concerning import specialisation (in terms of export sources) at di¤erent income levels, which we will later on contrast with the data in Section 4.
We keep the same commodity space and preference structure as those previously used in Section 2. However, we now assume that the world V is composed by two subsets of countries, each with positive measure. We will refer to the two subsets as region H and region L and, whenever it proves convenient, to countries belonging to them by h 2 H and l 2 L, respectively.
A straightforward way to introduce absolute advantages would be by letting total factor pro-ductivity di¤er across H and L, with H > L . This would in turn lead to w H > w L in equilibrium.
However, in our setup, if all countries received i.i.d. sectoral draws z;v from the same uniform density function, then countries from H would not necessarily enjoy a comparative advantage in the higher-quality versions of the di¤erentiated goods. This counter-empirical result, which we wish to avoid, is the consequence of the e¤ect of H > L becoming less important relative to di¤erences in z;v at higher levels of quality, while being partially undone by w H > w L :
For this reason, we instead let countries in H and L di¤er from each other in that they face di¤erent random generating processes for their productivity parameters z;v z2Z . In particular,
we assume that, on the one hand, for any h 2 H and every z 2 Z, each z;h is independently drawn from a uniform density function with support ; , where > 1, just like in the previous section.
On the other hand, for any l 2 L and every z 2 Z, we assume that each z;l = . (None of our results hinges upon countries in region L drawing their sectoral productivities from a degenerate distribution; in Section 3.3 we extend the results to multiple regions, where they all draw sectoral productivities from non-degenerate uniform distributions.)
This setup still features the fact that sectoral productivity di¤erentials may become increasingly pronounced at higher levels of quality. In addition, it allows for the presence of absolute advantages (at the aggregate level) across subsets of countries, which were absent in section 2.
Proposition 3 Suppose that the set V is composed by two disjoint subsets with positive measure:
H and L. Assume that: a) for any (z; h) 2 Z H, z;h is independently drawn uniform density function with support ; ; b) for any (z; l) 2 Z L, z;l = . Then:
Proposition 3 states that equilibrium wages in region H will be higher than in region L. The intuition for this result is analogous to all Ricardian models of trade with absolute and comparative advantages. Essentially, region H (which displays an absolute advantage over region L) will enjoy higher wages than region L, since this is necessary to lower the monetary costs in L, and thus allow countries in L to export enough to countries in H and keep the trade balance in equilibrium.
Henceforth, without loss of generality, we take the wage in region L as the numeraire of the economy, and accordingly set w L = 1.
From the results in Proposition 3, it immediately follows that optimal choices will be identical for countries from the same region. That is, for any h 0 ; h 00 2 H, we have that
z;v and q h 0 z;v = q h 00 z;v , while for any l 0 ; l 00 2 L, we have that
z;v and q l 0 z;v = q l 00 z;v , in both cases for all (z; v) 2 Z V. In other words, the demand intensity and the consumed quality for a speci…c variety of a di¤erentiated good is common to all countries belonging to the same region. We thus introduce the following notation, which will be recurrently used in the next subsections: (i) H z;v denotes the demand intensity for (z; v) 2 Z V by a consumer from region H; (ii) L z;v denotes the demand intensity for (z; v) 2 Z V by a consumer from region L.
Recall also that our preferences imply that the willingness to pay for quality is increasing in the consumer's income. As a consequence, in the presence of cross-country income inequality, consumers from H purchase higher quality versions than consumers from L. In addition, given the income level, consumers optimally tend to choose a relatively higher quality of consumption for those commodities carrying a relatively lower z;v . The next proposition formally states these results concerning the consumer choice.
Proposition 4 Let q H
z;v and q L z;v denote the quality of consumption of commodity (z; v) 2 Z V purchased by a consumer from region H and from region L, respectively. Then, in equilibrium:
(ii) for all (z; h) 2 Z H: @q i z;h =@ z;h 0, with @q i z;h =@ z;h < 0 whenever q i z;h > 1, for i = H; L.
In addition, denoting by q i z; (resp. q i z; ) the value of q i z;h corresponding to the commodity (z; h) 2 Z H such that z;h = (resp. ):
The …rst result in Proposition 4 follows from the rising willingness-to-pay for quality implied preferences in (3): richer consumers substitute lower-quality versions of each good z by higherquality versions of them.
The second result states that, considering all commodities produced within region H, the quality of consumption within a given country is a monotonically decreasing function of the labour requirement elasticities of quality upgrading z;h . In that regard, notice that since all countries in H have the same wage, a larger z;h will map monotonically into a higher monetary cost, given the level of quality.
Finally, the third result shows that, for any given level of consumer income, the quality of the goods produced within region L is neither the highest nor the lowest. In particular, the highest quality of each good z purchased by any consumer is produced in the country of region H that received the best draw, z;h = . Conversely, the lowest quality of each good z purchased by any consumer is produced in the country of region H that received the worst draw, z;h = . In this last case, despite the fact that all producers from L received draws equal to , the lower labour cost in L allows them to sell higher qualities than the least e¢ cient producers from H. Nonetheless, in spite of w H > 1, the highest qualities are still provided by the countries with the absolute advantage in the sector.
Export specialisation
We proceed now to study the patterns of exporters' specialisation in this world economy with cross-country inequality. Recall the de…nition of the RCA from (11) . Notice …rst that the equality of total world demand across all di¤erentiated sectors z 2 Z found in Section 2 still holds true when countries di¤er in income. As a consequence, also in this version of the model we have that
We let 2 (0; 1) denote the Lebesgue measure of H. We can observe that total exports by sector z from country v are given by:
Moreover, integrating over Z, we obtain the aggregate exports by country v as:
Now, notice that since z;l = , we must have that
Hence, denoting by RCA z;l the revealed comparative advantage of country l 2 L in good z 2 Z, using (13) and (14) we obtain:
Consider now a country h 2 H. Since all h obtain their draws of z;h from independent U ; distributions, and since all (13) and (14) lead to:
Note that the demand intensities i z;h are all decreasing functions of the draws z;h . 14 We can then state the following result, which links again the revealed comparative advantage of an exporter in sector z to its productivity draw.
Proposition 5
As we did before, by looking at a particular z, we may compare the RCA of di¤erent countries in a given sector. We can then observe that Proposition 5 yields an analogous result in terms of export specialisation as Proposition 2: economies with lower z;h draws tend to display stronger RCA in sector z. Furthermore, producers from the country that received the best possible draw, z;h = , always display the highest observed value of RCA z;h . However, in contrast with Proposition 2, in this version of the model the RCAs no longer map monotonically into sectoral absolute advantages.
More precisely, since the wage di¤erential between regions H and L creates a wedge between the absolute and the comparative advantage, it is no longer the case that RCA z;v can be represented by a monotonically decreasing function of the productivity draw z;v for all v 2 V. In fact, although a country h 2 H with draw e < z;h < displays higher labour productivity in sector z than any country l 2 L, the RCA in sector z of country h turns out to be smaller than the one of any country l.
Finally notice that, according to Proposition 4, those producers from H that received draws z;h = are also the ones to end up selling the highest qualities of good z in the world markets. In fact, they sell the highest quality to both consumers from H and L. As a consequence, merging the results in Proposition 4 and Proposition 5, our model yields an interesting prediction that we will bring to the data in Section 4. Namely, countries that display a stronger revealed comparative advantage in sector z are also those exporting varieties of good z at higher levels of quality.
Import Specialisation
We turn now to study the implications of this version of the model in terms of import specialisation.
Recall the de…nition of import penetration from (10): for any country i, the import penetration 1 4 This result is an immediate implication of the second result in Proposition 4. Proof. In Appendix A.
Proposition 6 states that the import penetration of any particular good sourced from exporters exhibiting the highest RCA in that sector are larger in countries from region H than in countries from region L. In other words, the share of imports originating from exporters exhibiting the strongest cost advantage in producing a given good grows with the importer's per capita income. This is because the nonhomothetic structure of preferences implies that richer importers tend to buy high-quality commodities, while such commodities are those exhibiting wider cost di¤erentials across countries. To the best of our knowledge, this is a novel prediction in the trade literature that has never been tested empirically. In Section 4.2, we provide evidence consistent with the prediction that richer economies are more likely to buy their imports from producers who display a stronger revealed comparative advantage in the imported goods.
Extension: Cross-country inequality in a multi-region world
We consider now an extension to the previous setup where the world is composed by K > 2 regions, indexed by k = 1; :::; K. We let V k V denote the subset of countries from region k, where V k has Lebesgue measure k > 0. In addition, we let each country in region k be denoted by a particular v k 2 V k . (All the results discussed in this section are formalised in Appendix B.)
We assume that for any v k 2 V k and every z 2 Z, each z;v k is independently drawn from a uniform distribution with support over [ k ; ], where k < . To keep the consistency with the previous sections, let k = when k = 1. In addition, let k 0 < k 00 for any two regions k 0 < k 00 .
In other words, we are indexing regions k = 1; :::; K in terms of …rst-order stochastic dominance of their respective uniform distributions. All uniform distributions are assumed to share the same upper-bound , while they di¤er in their lower-bounds k .
In this extended setup, equilibrium wages will display an analogous structure as the one described in Proposition 3. Namely, in equilibrium, the wage for all v k 2 V k will be w k . In addition, equilibrium wages are such that w 1 > ::: > w k 0 > ::: > w K , where 1 < k 0 < K.
We now use the superindex j = 1; 2; :::; K to denote the region of origin of the consumer.
(Notice that, since all individuals from the same region earn the same wages, they choose identical consumption pro…les.) We then let j z;v k denote the demand intensity by a consumer from region
In equilibrium, it must be the case that X v k = w k for all v k 2 V k . In addition, W z = W for all z 2 Z is still true in this extended setup. As a result, the RCA of country v k in good z is given by:
Since wages di¤er across regions, once again, we cannot …nd a monotonic relationship between (17) and the productivity draws z;v k when all countries in the world are pooled together. However, we can still …nd a result analogous to Proposition 5. In particular, it is still true that the highest value of RCA z;v k corresponds to the country in region V 1 receiving the best possible draw in sector z. That is, RCA z;v k is the highest for some country v 1 with z;v 1 = .
Lastly, concerning import penetration, this extension also yields a result that is analogous to that in Proposition 6. Following the notation in Proposition 6, we can show that , where 1 < k 0 < K. Again, this result stems from the fact that our preferences are nonhomothetic in quality, hence richer consumers allocate a larger share of their spending in good z to the producers who can most e¢ ciently o¤er higher qualities versions of that good.
Empirical analysis
In this section we bring some of the main results of our theoretical model to the data. We divide the section in two parts. The …rst part presents evidence consistent with the notion that export specialisation at the product level becomes greater at higher levels of quality of production.
The second deals with our model's prediction regarding import specialisation at di¤erent income levels. In particular, it provides evidence consistent with the hypothesis that richer countries import relatively more from exporters displaying stronger comparative advantage in the goods being imported.
Exporters behaviour
Our theory is fundamentally based on the assumption that sectoral productivity di¤erentials across countries become wider along their respective quality ladders. In its purest sense, this assumption is really hard to test empirically. However, the intensi…cation of sectoral productivity di¤erentials at higher qualities implies that the degree of specialisation of countries in speci…c goods and the level of quality of their exports should display a positive correlation. In this subsection we aim to provide some evidence consistent with this prediction.
Objective data on products quality is hardly available for a large set of goods. 15 For that reason, we take unit values as a proxy for the quality of the commodity. 16 Like in the previous sections, in order to measure the degree of specialisation we use the revealed comparative advantage (RCA).
That is, for each exporter x of good z in year t, we compute the ratio:
where V z;x;t (resp. W z;t ) is the total value of exports of good z by country x (resp. by the world) in year t, and V x;t (resp. W t ) is the aggregate value of exports by country x (resp. by the world) in year t.
We compute unit values of exports using the dataset compiled by Gaulier and Zignano (2010).
This database reports monetary values and physical quantities of bilateral trade for years 1995 to
2009 for more than 5000 products categorised according to the 6-digit Harmonised System (HS-6).
Monetary values are measured FOB (free on board) in US dollars. We use the same dataset to compute the RCA of each exporter in each particular HS-6 product.
In our model, comparative advantages become stronger at higher levels of quality of production.
Taking unit values as proxy for quality, this implies that the average unit values of exports by each country in each of the traded goods should correlate positively with the RCA of the exporter in those goods. 1 5 The only article we are aware of assessing the e¤ects of product quality on export performance using objective measures of quality is Crozet, Head and Mayer (2012) for the champagne industry in France. 1 6 There is a large literature in trade using unit values as proxy for quality: e. To assess this implication, we …rst run the following regression:
log (weighted_mean_P z;x;t ) = + log (RCA z;x;t ) + z + t + z;x;t :
The dependent variable in (18) is the logarithm of the average unit value of exports across importers, using export shares as weights for each importer's unit value. 17 The regression also includes product dummies z (to control for di¤erent average prices of goods across di¤erent categories of the HS-6 system) and time dummies t (to control for aggregate price levels, which may well di¤er across years). The results of regression (18) are shown in column (1) of Table 1 .A. Consistent with our model, the variables log (RCA z;x;t ) and log (weighted_mean_P z;x;t ) display a positive correlation, which is also highly signi…cant. 18 It might be the case that the above correlation is simply re ‡ecting the fact that more developed economies tend to capture larger markets for their products and, at the same time, tend to produce higher quality versions of the traded products. 19 To account for that possibility, in column (2) we include the logarithm of exporter's income per capita. As we can observe, the coe¢ cient associated to this variable is indeed positive and highly signi…cant. 20 Nevertheless, our estimate of remains essentially unaltered and highly signi…cant, suggesting that the correlation between RCA and export unit values is not solely driven by di¤erences in the exporters'income per head.
In fact, if the positive correlation found in column (1) were spuriously re ‡ecting richer countries commanding greater export market shares and, at the same time, selling more expensive varieties, then the restricted regression in column (1) should actually yield a higher estimate of than the regression in column (2), and not a lower one as it is the case in Table 1 .A. 1 7 More precisely, the dependent variable is computed as follows:
log (weighted_mean_Pz;x;t) log X m2M vz;x;m;t vz;x;t vz;x;m;t cz;x;m;t ! ; where: vz;x;m;t (resp. cz;x;m;t) denotes the monetary value (resp. the physical quantity) of exports of good z,
by exporter x, to importer m, in year t. The summation is across the set of importers, M . To mitigate the possible contaminating e¤ects of outliers, we have discarded unit values above the 95th percentile and below the 5th percentile for each exporter and product (our results remain essentially intact if we do not trim the price data at the two extremes of the distribution). T he total number of different products is 5017. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
T he results of the first-stage regression of column (5) are reported in Appendix C (Additional Empirical Results)
Dependent Variable: log of (weighted) mean unit value of exports
In column (3) we add a set of exporter dummies to the regression. The rationale for this is to control for …xed (or slow-changing) exporters' characteristics (such as, geographic location, institutions, openness to trade) which may somehow a¤ect average export prices, and may be at the same time correlated with export penetration. Our correlation of interest falls a bit in magnitude, but still remains positive and highly signi…cant.
Finally, in column (4) we include a full set of product-exporter …xed e¤ects. These dummies would control for …xed characteristics of exporters in speci…c markets: for example, geographic distance from the exporter to the main importers of a given product. More importantly, this set of dummies would also take into account the intensity of competition in speci…c industries across di¤erent exporters, and the fact that exporters that command larger market shares in a speci…c industry may tend to charge prices that are systematically higher or lower. 21 Interestingly, even after including product-exporter dummies, our estimate of the correlation between log of RCA and log of export unit values remains positive and highly signi…cant, rising also in magnitude by a fair amount. In addition, the estimate associated to the exporter's income per head also remains positive and signi…cant.
Measurement error
One additional serious concern with regression (18) is that both weighted_mean_P z;x;t and RCA z;x;t are computed using data on revenues and quantities. As a consequence, measurement error in either of these two variables may lead to a bias in the estimate of . The bias owing to this type of (non-classical) measurement error may actually go in either direction. 22 In order to deal with this concern, as further robustness check, in column (5) we run a twostage least-squares regression where we instrument RCA z;x;t by the number of export destinations of good z exported by country x in year t. (We compute the number of destinations of productexporter-year (z; x; t) by counting the number of countries whose value of imports of z originating from x in t are non-zero.) The underlying idea for this instrument is the following. Firstly, it is expectable that exporters displaying a greater RCA in a good will also tend to export this good (in strictly positive amounts) to a larger number of importer. (This intuition is con…rmed by the result of the …rst-stage regression, which is reported in Appendix C.) Secondly, it is likely that the binary variable 'whether exports of a particular product to a particular importer are zero or non-zero'will be su¤ering from much less severe measurement error than the total value of sales or physical quantities. 23 The results in column (5) show that our correlation of interest remains positive and highly signi…cant. 24 Sectoral level regressions Table 1 .A shows pooled regressions for all HS-6 products. However, the correlation of interest may well di¤er across industries. To get a feeling of whether the previous results are mainly driven by particular sector, we next split the set of HS 6-digit products according to fourteen separate subgroups at the 2-digit level. 25 In Table 1 .B, we repeat the regression conducted in on the total value of output of the …rm. To deal with the measurement error bias, they instrument total output by the level of total employment of the …rm, which is arguably subject to less measurement error. 2 4 We have also run a two-stage least square regression using the lagged value of the revealed comparative advantage as instrument (i.e., instrumenting RCAz;x;t by RCAz;x;t 1). This regression, which is available from the authors upon request, also yields a positive and highly signi…cant coe¢ cient for the correlation of interest. column (4), but running it separately for each of the 14 subgroups. Although the point estimates for tend to di¤er across subgroups, in all cases they come out positive and highly signi…cant (except for 'Mineral Products' where it is actually negative and signi…cant). Interestingly (and quite expectably), the point estimates for and for the correlation with the exporter's income per capita are largest for 'Machinery/Electrical' and 'Transportation' products, which comprise manufacturing industries producing highly di¤erentiated products in terms of intrinsic quality.
Importers behaviour
Another key aspect of our theory is how imports respond to variations in incomes. The model predicts that changes in incomes will lead to: (i) changes in the quality of consumption, and
(ii) changes in the distribution of total production across di¤erent economies. The former result stems from our nonhomothetic preferences, while the latter derives from the interaction between nonhomotheticity and the increasing heterogeneity of sectoral productivities at higher levels of quality.
Concerning the …rst prediction, there is vast evidence showing that richer consumers buy their imports in higher quality levels than poorer consumers do: e. The previous literature linking import prices and the importer's GDP per head has then provided evidence consistent with the hypothesis that richer individuals purchase goods in higher quality levels. However, that literature has mostly remained silent as to where those imports tend to originate from. In that regard, our model also yields an interesting prediction regarding imports specialisation: if it is true that taste for quality rises with income and comparative advantages deepen at higher levels of quality, then richer countries should purchase a larger share of their imports of given goods from economies displaying a comparative advantage in those goods.
In what follows we aim at providing evidence of such relationship between importer's income per head and origin of imports. (For computational purposes, given the large number of observations, Table 2 .A uses only data from 2009, which is the last year available in the panel.) 26 Like in the previous sections, in order to measure the degree of import specialisation we use import penetration at the product level. That is, for each importer m and exporter x of good z in year t, we compute the ratio:
where impo z;m;x denotes the value of imports of good z by importer m originating from exporter x, and X denotes the set of exporters in the sample.
In Table 2 .A, we regress IP z;m;x on the RCA of x in z interacted with the importer's income per head (Y m ). More precisely, we conduct the following regression:
Our model predicts a positive value for . This would suggest that richer importers tend to buy a larger share of the imports of good z from exporters exhibiting a comparative advantage in z. Regression (19) includes product dummies ( z ), importer dummies ( m ), exporter dummies (" x ), and a set of bilateral gravity terms (G m;x ) taken from Mayer and Zignano (2006) .
Before strictly running regression (19) , in column (1) of Table 2 .A, we …rst regress the log of IP for importer m against only the log of the RCA of exporter x in good z (together with product, importer and exporter dummies), which shows as we would expect that those two variables are positively correlated. Secondly, in column (2), we report the results of the regression that includes the interaction term. We can see that the estimated is positive and highly signi…cant, consistent with our theory. Finally, in column (3), we add six traditional gravity terms, and we can observe the previous results remain essentially intact. We can also observe that the estimates for each of the gravity terms are signi…cant, and they all carry the expected sign.
Notice that regression (19) includes exporter …xed e¤ects (" x ). This implies that our regressions are actually comparing di¤erent degrees of export specialisation across products and destinations for a given exporter. 27 As such, exporter dummies would take care of the possibility that our estimates may be spuriously capturing the fact the a country with higher total factor productivity will be commanding larger market shares and specialising more strongly in higher qualities varieties of goods, which are exactly the types of varieties purchased by richer importers.
Simultaneity of RCA and import penetration
One possible concern with regression (19) is the fact that RCA z;x is computed with the same data that is used to construct IP z;m;x . In terms of our estimation of , this could represent an issue if a very large economy turns out to be also very rich (for example, the case of the US). In that case, since the imports of good z by such sizable and rich economy will be strongly in ‡uencing the independent variable RCA z;x , we may be somehow generating by construction a positive correlation between IP z;m;x and [log (Y m ) log (RCA z;x )].
In order to deal with this concern, in column (4) we split the set of 184 importers in two separate subsets of 92 importers each (subset A and subset B ). When splitting the original set of 184 importers, we do so in such a way the two subsets display similar GDP per capita distributions.
(See Appendix C for details and descriptive statistics of the two sub-samples.) We next use the subset A to compute the revealed comparative advantage of each exporter in each product (RCA z;x ), while we use the subset B for IP z;m;x . By construction, there is therefore no link between IP z;m;x and RCA z;x , since those two variable are computed with data from di¤erent sets of importers.
As we may readily observe, the results in column (4) of Table 2 .A con…rm our previous results in column (3) -the estimate for is positive and highly signi…cant, and of very similar magnitude as in column (3). Lastly, in column (5) we use the RCA computed with the subset A of importers to Robust absolute standard errors clustered at the importer and exporter level reported in parentheses. All data corresponds to the year 2009.
All regressions include product dummies, importer dummies and exporter dummies. T he total number of HS 6-digit products is 5017.
Column (4) uses importers in subset A to compute the exporters' RCA and importers in subset B to compute the dependent variable. Column (5) uses the RCA computed with importers in subset A to instrument the exporters' RCA. * significant 10%; ** significant 5%; *** significant 1%.
Restricted Sample
Dependent Variable: log impo shares of product i from exporter x Full Sample instrument the RCA used in column (3); again the obtained results con…rm our previous …ndings. 28 
Sectoral and product level regressions
The regressions in Table 2 .A pool together more than 5000 6-digit products, implicitly assuming the same coe¢ cients for all of them. This might actually be a strong assumption to make. In Table 2 .B we divide again the 6-digit products into 14 subgroups (the same subgroups we used before in Table 1 .B). In the sake of brevity, we report only the estimates for and in (19) . As we can observe, the estimates for each subgroup follow a similar pattern as those in Table 2 .A; in particular, the estimate associated to the interaction term is always positive and highly signi…cant 2 8 See Table 2 .A (extended) in Appendix C, for some additional robustness checks. There, in column (2) and (5),
we control for product-importer …xed e¤ects (& z;m ), instead of z and m separately as in (19) . In addition, in columns (3) and (4) we exclude high income countries from the OECD and high income countries as classi…ed by the World Bank, to see whether the previous results are mainly driven by the behaviour of richer economies. As it may be readily observed, our correlation of interest, in (19) , remains always positive and highly signi…cant. Robust absolute standard errors clustered at the importer-exporter level in parentheses. All data corresponds to year 2009.
All regression include product, exporter and importer dummies, and the set of gravity terms used before in Table 2 .A taken from Mayer & Zignano (2006) . * significant 10%; ** significant 5%; *** significant 1%.
foodstuff metals transport. textiles footwear Table 2 .C median insignificant significant 10% significant 1% insignificant significant 10% significant 1% coefficient Total number of different products was 4904 (98 products were lost due to insufficient observations). Data corresponds to year 2009 Regressions include importer dummies and the set of gravity terms used in for each subgroup. As further robustness check, in Table 2 .C, we report the percentage of positive and negative estimates for when we run a separate regression for each of the products in the HS 6-digit categorisation.
To sum up, taken jointly, Section 4 yields support to the following ideas: (i ) as getting richer, countries tend to raise the quality of the goods they consume (positive correlation between import prices and income per head of importer previously found in the literature); (ii ) this, in turn, leads them to raise their import shares sourced from exporters displaying a comparative advantage in those goods; (iii ) this alteration in the origin of imports would re ‡ect the fact that these are the exporters relatively more productive at providing higher quality varieties of those goods.
Conclusion
We presented a Ricardian model of trade with the distinctive feature that comparative advantages reveal themselves gradually over the course of development. The key factors behind this process are the individuals'upgrading in quality of consumption combined with productivity di¤erentials that widen up as countries seek to increase the quality of their production. As incomes grow and wealthier consumers raise the quality of their consumption baskets, cost di¤erentials between countries become more pronounced. The emergence of such heterogeneities, in turn, alters trade ‡ows, as each economy gradually specialises in producing the subset of goods for which they enjoy a rising comparative advantage.
Our model yielded a number of implications that …nd empirical support. In this respect, using bilateral trade data at the product level, we showed that the share of imports originating from exporters more intensely specialised in a given product correlates positively with GDP per head of the importer. This is consistent with the model's prediction that richer consumers tend to buy a larger share of their consumption of speci…c goods from countries exhibiting a comparative advantage in those goods. We also provided some evidence supporting the central assumption of our model, namely the intensi…cation of comparative advantage at higher quality levels. In particular, we found that the degree of export specialisation of countries in speci…c goods and the level of quality of their exports display a positive correlation. This fact is consistent with the idea that Ricardian specialisation tends to become more intense at the upper levels of quality.
As a last remark, our model has assumed away any sort of trade frictions. In a sense, this was a deliberate choice, so as to illustrate our proposed mechanism as cleanly as possible. Yet, incorporating trade costs could actually represent a promising extension to the core model. In this respect, owing to the widening of productivity di¤erentials at higher quality of production, a natural implication of the model would be that trade costs will generate milder distortions on trade ‡ows as the quality of production rises. This implication could help rationalizing some empirical observations found in the trade literature, such as the positive relationship between the imports/GDP ratio and the importer's GDP per head.
Appendix A: Omitted proofs
Formal derivation of utility (3). Our model may incorporate the following more general formulation of utility, mapping the exponential term (c z;v;q ) q associated to each commodity (z; v; q) 2 Z V Q into R using three nested CES functions:
where the parameters , $ and respectively govern the constant elasticity of substitution: (i) across qualities q 2 Q of the same good-variety pair (z; v); (ii) across varieties v 2 V of the same good z; and (iii) across goods z 2 Z.
Assumption 1 corresponds to setting = 1, i.e., an in…nite degree of substitution across qualities:
Hence the inner CES function reduces to (c z;v ) qz;v , where q z;v identi…es the selected quality of the good-variety pair (z; v), and c z;v represents the amount of physical consumption of (z; v). This yields:
Furthermore, we assume a unit elasticity of substitution across varieties, i.e., 1= (1 $) = 1, which implies $ = 0. Computing the limit of the middle CES function for $ ! 0 leads to an indeterminacy, solved using de l'Hôpital theorem to obtain:
Using this expression into (21), utility (3) obtains.
Solution of Problem (6) . Let i denote the Lagrange multiplier associated to the budget constraint, and by 
where:
Note that, although z in (23) are indexed by z, in the optimum all z will turn out to be equal.
Hence, we may write that, in the optimum, z = for all z. 29 Using then the fact that z = for all z, we can next de…ne:
which in turn allows us to re-write (23) as q i z;v = i i z;v . Hence, integrating both sides of the equation over Z and V, and making use of (25), we may obtain:
which in turn implies that:
Notice also that i 1, since q i z;v 1 and both Z and V have unit mass.
Proof of Lemma 1. Let's …rst show that when w v = w for all v 2 V and unit labour requirements are given by (1), then none of the constraints q z;v 1 of (6) binds in the optimum. For this, note that given the expressions in (22) and (27) , whenever w v = w for all v 2 V, it must be the case that q i z 0 ;v 0 q i z 00 ;v 00 , z 0 ;v 0 z 00 ;v 00 . Thus, if in the optimum q i z 00 ;v 00 > 1 holds for a (z 00 ; v 00 ) 2 Z V with z 00 ;v 00 = , then q i z;v > 1 must be true for all (z; v) 2 Z V. Then, in order to prove that q i z;v > 1 holds for all (z; v) 2 Z V, it su¢ ces to prove the following: even when all z;v = , except for a single (zero-mass) good-variety (z 00 ; v 00 ) for which z 00 ;v 00 = , the optimisation problem (6) yields q i z 00 ;v 00 > 1. If this is the case, then q i z 00 ;v 00 > 1 will actually hold true for any distribution of the productivity draws z;v with support in the interval ; , which includes the uniform distribution as one special case. 2 9 The result z = for all z stems from the assumed iid draws of z;v with a continuum of countries and goods.
The combination of these assumptions implies that all goods z will display (ex post ) an identical distribution of z;v over the space of countries v. Such ex post symmetry in the distribution of z;v across goods, in turn, leads consumers to optimally set z = for all z.
When all z;v = , except for a single (zero-mass) (z 00 ; v 00 ) with z 00 ;v 00 = , it follows that when q z 00 ;v 00 = 1:
; for all (z; v) 2 Z V other than z 00 ; v 00 :
Since the set Z V has unit mass, integrating (28) across the space Z and V, we obtain i = e =( 1) (1 + ) = A i 1= ( 1) , which in turn yields:
Now, plugging (29) into (22) and (27), computed for (z 00 ; v 00 ), while using the fact that i z 00 ;v 00 = 1= i when q i z 00 ;v 00 = 1, we get:
Hence, considering the de…nition of A e 
However, (31) cannot be true for any > 0: As a consequence, it must be true that q z 00 ;v 00 > 1 for all > 0, implying in turn that q z;v > 1 must hold (z; v) 2 Z V under any distribution of z;v with support within the interval ; when w v = w for all v 2 V. Now, taking into account the above result, we can use (26) , (27) and (22), setting i z;v = 0 for all (z; v) 2 Z V, to obtain (7) and (8) .
Finally, note that, when w v = w for all v 2 V, using again (22) leads to ln (1 + ) ln A ln i = z;v + z;v 1 ln q i z;v for all (z; v) 2 Z V. De…ning now i ( ) ln (1 + ) ln A ln i , we can observe that:
But, given that z;v 1 > 0, then all @q i z;v =@ must necessarily carry the same sign. Suppose then that @q i z;v =@ 0, for all (z; v) 2 Z V. Recalling (26) , it follows that @ i =@ 0 as well.
But, since @ i =@ = (1 + )
which in turn contradicts the fact that @q i z;v =@ 0 for all (z; v) 2 Z V. As a result, it must be the case that @q i z;v =@ > 0 for all (z; v) 2 Z V.
Proof of Proposition 1. Existence of equilibrium: As a …rst step, we prove that w v = w for all v 2 V is an equilibrium of the model. Firstly, notice that when w i = w for all i 2 V, the Lagrange multipliers will be identical for all countries, and in particular we may write i = for all i 2 V.
Secondly, using Lemma 1, when w v = w for all v 2 V, conditions in (22) together with (27) and i = for all i 2 V, lead to:
Now, recall that each z;v is drawn from from an independent uniform probability distribution with support ; . Hence, by the law of large numbers, for each country v 2 V, the (in…nite) sequence of draws z;v z2Z
will also be uniformly distributed over ; along the goods space. This implies that, integrating over Z and bearing in mind (34) , (25), and swapping the order of integration, we obtain R V dv = 1, which in turn implies that = 1 since V has unit mass. Then, it is easy to check that all conditions (9) hold simultaneously when w v = w for all v 2 V.
Equilibrium uniqueness: We now proceed to prove the above equilibrium is unique. Normalise w = 1, and suppose for a subset J V of countries with measure j > 0 we have w j > 1, while for a (disjoint) subset K V of countries with measure k > 0 we have w k < 1. Denote …nally by I V the (complementary) subset of countries with w i = 1. Consider some k 2 K, i 2 I, and j 2 J , and take (z k ; k) ; (z i ; i) ; (z j ; j) such that: z k ;k = z i ;i = z j ;j = . Notice that, due to the law of large numbers, for any 2 ; the measure of good-variety couples for which the last condition is satis…ed is the same in k, i and j.
As a …rst step, take country i 2 I. (22) and (23) imply that, for (z k ; k), (z i ; i) and (z j ; j), we must have, respectively:
Notice also from (24) and (27) As a second step, take country k 2 K. (22) and (23) imply that, for (z k ; k), (z i ; i) and (z j ; j), we must have, respectively:
Following an analogous reasoning as before, it follows that
As a third step, take country j 2 J , and notice w j > 1. (22) and (23) imply that, for (z k ; k), (z i ; i) and (z j ; j), we must have, respectively:
Again, an analogous reasoning as in the previous cases leads to
Finally, integrate among the good space Z and country space V. The above results lead to:
Note that the …rst line in (35) equals the world spending on commodities produced in k, the second equals the world spending on commodities produced in i, and the third equals the world spending on commodities produced in j. However, when w k < 1 < w j , those inequalities are inconsistent with market clearing conditions (9) . As a result, there cannot exist an equilibrium with measure j > 0 of countries with w j > 1 and/or a measure k > 0 of countries with w k < 1.
Proof of Proposition 2. Preliminarily, notice that (26) together with (27) yields: 
thus, computing (37) for any pair of commodities (z 0 ; v 0 ) ; (z 00 ; v 00 ) 2 Z V yields:
1 ln q z 0 ;v 0 + z 0 ;v 0 = z 00 ;v 00 1 ln q z 00 ;v 00 + z 00 ;v 00 :
Hence, (38) implies that q z 0 ;v 0 > q z 00 ;v 00 () z 0 ;v 0 < z 00 v 00 . By considering this result in conjunction with (36), our claim immediately follows.
Part (ii). Di¤erentiating (38) with respect to yields:
Using (26), (37) and (39):
Furthermore, from (36), and considering (39) and (40):
It is then easy to observe that (39) implies that dq z 0 ;v 0 =d > dq z 00 ;v 00 =d when z 0 ;v 0 < z 00 v 00 . By considering this result in conjunction with (41) our claim immediately follows. Proof of Proposition 3. We prove the proposition in di¤erent steps. We …rst prove that, if an equilibrium exists, then for all h 2 H and all l 2 L, it must necessarily be the case that: 1)
Part iii). From (26), it immediately follows that
Lastly, we prove that a unique equilibrium exists, with:
Preliminarily, consider a generic country i 2 V, and compute the aggregate demand by i for goods produced in country v 2 V. From the …rst-order conditions, it follows that:
Hence, total demand by i for goods produced in h 2 H and in l 2 L are given, respectively by:
Step 1 As a result, the value in (43) must be strictly larger than the value in (44), since the term
is strictly decreasing in . As a consequence, given that i represents a generic country in V, integrating over the set V, it follows that the world demand for goods produced in a country from H will be strictly larger than the world demand for goods produced in a country from L. But this is inconsistent with the market clearing conditions, which require that world demand is equal for all v 2 V. Hence, w v = w for all v 2 V cannot hold in equilibrium.
Step 2. Suppose that, in equilibrium, w h 0 > w h 00 for some h 0 ; h 00 2 H. Computing (43) respectively for h 0 and h 00 yields:
w i w h 00
Now, since i represents a generic country in V, integrating over the set V, it follows that the world demand for goods produced in country h 0 will be no larger than the world demand for goods produced in country h 00 . But this is inconsistent with the market clearing conditions, which require that world demand for goods produced in country h 0 must be strictly larger than world demand for goods produced in country h 00 . Furthermore, an analogous reasoning rules out w h 0 < w h 00 .
As a consequence, it must be the case that, if an equilibrium exists, it must be characterised by w h 0 = w h 00 for any h 0 ; h 00 2 H. (Similarly, it can be proved that, if an equilibrium exists, it must be characterised by w l 0 = w l 00 for any l 0 ; l 00 2 L.)
Step 3. Bearing in mind the result in the previous step, denote by w L the wage of a country belonging to L and by w H the wage of a country belonging to H. In addition, without any loss of generality, let w L = 1 (i.e., take w L as the numeraire of the world economy). Suppose now that
is strictly decreasing in , it follows that the value in (44) is no larger than the value in (43). Moreover, since i represents a generic country in V, integrating over the set V, we obtain that the world demand for goods produced in a country from region L is no larger than world demand for goods produced in a country from region H. But this is inconsistent with the market clearing conditions when w H < 1, which require that world demand for goods produced in a country from region L must be strictly larger than world demand for goods produced in a country from region H.
Step 4. As a result of steps 1, 2 and 3, our only remaining candidate for an equilibrium is then w H > w L = 1. From (43), it follows that the aggregate demand by any h 0 2 H for goods produced in region H coincides with its aggregate supply to the same region. Hence, there must be no net surplus within region H. Analogously, from (44) it follows that there must be no net surplus within region L. As a result, a necessary condition for market clearing is that the aggregate demand by region L for goods produced in region H must equal the aggregate demand by region H for goods
Suppose now that w H ! 1. Then, on the one hand, from (43) we obtain the aggregate demand by l 0 2 L for goods produced in region H would be equal to a …nite (non-negative) number. Since this would hold true for every l 0 2 L, then the aggregate demand by region L for goods produced in region H -left-hand side of (45)-would be equal to a …nite (non-negative) number. On the other hand, from (43) it follows that when w H ! 1 the aggregate demand by h 0 2 H for goods produced in any l 2 L would tend to in…nity. Since this would hold true for every h 0 2 H and l 2 L, then the aggregate demand by region H for goods produced in region L -right-hand side of (45)-would also tend to in…nity. But this then is inconsistent with the equality required by condition (45). Hence, if an equilibrium exists, it must be then characterised by w L < w H < 1.
Step 5. Finally, we prove now that there exists an equilibrium 1 < w H < 1, and this equilibrium is unique. Recall that, by setting w L = 1, w H represents the relative wage between region H and region L.
Step 1 shows that, should the relative wage equal one, then the world demand for goods produced in a country from H would be strictly larger than the world demand for goods produced in a country from L.
Step 4 shows instead that, should w H ! 1, then the world demand for goods produced in a country from H would be strictly smaller than the world demand for goods produced in a country from L. Consider now (42) for any v = h 2 H, implying that w h = w H , and notice that the demand intensities i z;h are all non-increasing in w H . In addition, consider (42) for any v = l 2 L, implying that w l = 1, and notice that in this case the i z;l are all non-decreasing in w H , while they are strictly increasing in w H for at least some z 2 Z when i 2 H. Therefore, taking all this into account, together with the expressions in (43) and (44), it follows that the world demand for goods produced in a country from L may increase with w H , while world demand for goods produced in a country from H will decrease with w H . Hence, by continuity, there must necessarily exist some 1 < w H < 1 consistent with all market clearing conditions holding simultaneously. In addition, this equilibrium must then also be unique.
Proof of Proposition 4.
Part (i). From the FOC (22) - (25) we may obtain that for a consumer in any country in region L the following conditions must hold: Similarly, for a consumer in any country in region H, it must be true that:
( 1) ln q Part (ii). The claim straightforwardly follows by di¤erentiation of conditions (47) and (49). This yields @q i z;h =@ z;h = q i z;h 1 + ln q i z;h = z;h 1 < 0 whenever q i z;h > 1, while @q i z;h =@ z;h = 0 whenever q i z;h = 1:
Part (iii). The proof that q i z;l = q i L for all (z; l) 2 Z L follows straightforwardly from (46) and (48). For the second argument, let i = L, and consider the commodity (z 0 ; h 0 ) 2 Z H such that
Using (46) and (47) we obtain, respectively: 
which in turn implies that q H L w H = H < 1. Now, using the fact that w H L > H and the result L q L L , the last inequality …nally yields q H L < L q L L , leading to a contradiction. Hence, it must necessarily be that b > . Thus, given the fact that @q L z;h =@ z;h < 0 whenever q L z;h > 1, the result q L z; < q L L < q L z; immediately follows. An analogous reasoning, letting i = H, may be followed to prove that q H z; < q H L < q H z; .
Proof of Proposition 6. Using (48) and (49), together with (27), for a consumer from H we get:
ln (1 + ) ln A = Similarly, considering (46) and (47) together with (27) , in the case of a consumer from L we obtain: Therefore, from the above expressions we may obtain: 
Recall now that @ i z;h =@ z;h < 0 whenever q i z;h > 1, while @ i z;h =@ z;h = 0 if q i z;h = 1. In addition, recall that q H z;h q L z;h . As a result, using (54), we can observe that for any two pairs (z; h 0 ) and (z; h 00 ) such that z;h 0 = < z;h 00 , That is, the world demand for goods produced in a country from region k 0 is strictly larger than world demand for goods produced in a country from region k 00 . But this is inconsistent with the market clearing conditions when w k 0 w k 00 , which require that world demand for goods produced in a country from region k 0 must be no larger than world demand for goods produced in a country from region k 00 . As a consequence, it must be that w k 0 > w k 00 . Robust absolute standard errors clustered at the importer and exporter level reported in parentheses. All data corresponds to the year 2009.
All regressions include: distance, contiguity, common official language, common coloniser, common legal origin and common currency.
Column (5) uses importers in subset A to compute the exporters' RCA and importers in subset B to compute the dependent variable.
* significant 10%; ** significant 5%; *** significant 1%.
Dependent Variable: log impo shares of product i from exporter x
